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Few financial innovations in recent times have had the impact of exchange traded funds (ETFs). With assets approaching $3.5 trillion, ETFs are now larger than hedge funds.
Worldwide there are approximately 5000 exchange traded funds, making ETFs the preferred investment approach for a wide range of investors. Indeed, it does not seem an exaggeration to argue that the growth of passive investing via ETFs has posed a "disruptive innovation" for the entire asset management industry.
2 For many investors, the main innovation of ETFs is to provide a more liquid, lower-cost alternative to mutual funds. For others, the innovation is access to previously unavailable asset classes. In this paper, we argue that another, perhaps under-appreciated, innovation is an expanded ability to hedge. We demonstrate that this aspect of ETF innovation has a direct impact on the nature of informed trading and the efficiency of the market.
We hypothesize that ETFs can reduce hedging costs for informed investors. We develop this hypothesis based both on the theoretical literature on financial innovation and on industry reports on ETFs. The literature shows that financial innovations such as introducing a new security can improve risk-sharing (Allen and Gale (1994) ). Moreover, Dow (1998) and Simsek (2013) show that the new security could enhance investors' arbitrage profits if it could be used to hedge their arbitrage risk. This idea of hedging is also widely observed in practice, especially in reports on how hedge funds use ETFs. For example, Bloomberg recently reported "Hedge funds mainly use ETFs to take short positions. … As a group, hedge funds have $105 billion in short ETF positions --more than double their $43 billion in long positions. … The funds'
2 Ananth Madhavan makes the case for such disruptive innovation in his book Exchange Traded Funds and the New Dynamics of Investments, (FMA Survey and Synthesis: 2016) .
shorts don't necessarily indicate bearish sentiment, but rather are used to hedge out part of the market in order to isolate a long position."
3
To investigate this hedging role, we focus on the role played by industry ETFs. Industry
ETFs are appealing for two reasons. First, it is natural to use an industry ETF to hedge the industry risk of a firm. Because a firm's risk usually includes market risk, industry risk, and firm-specific risk, an informed trader hoping to profit from firm-specific information will want to hedge the market risk and the industry risk. While index futures or index ETFs are used to hedge the market risk, the advent of industry ETFs provides a vehicle to hedge the industry risk. Second, from a technical perspective, the cross-sectional variation of the industry ETF membership and the time-series variation of the inception date of each industry ETF allow us to identify and quantify the economic impact of the industry ETF. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to address these industry-hedging effects specifically.
We first establish two important facts. We show that the industry ETF is more likely to experience large short interest than either the non-industry ETF or individual stocks. Indeed, we find that the industry ETF has a short interest ratio (short interest/shares outstanding) of 60% at the 95 percentile, in contrast to the non-industry ETF (individual stocks) which has less than 20% (17%) at the same percentile. 4 More interesting, we find that large short interest on the industry ETF does not imply a bearish outlook. On the contrary, we find that large short interest predicts more positive earnings surprises among the underlying stocks of the industry ETF.
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that informed investors use the industry ETF to hedge their long positions on firms with positive private information, implementing in effect a "long the underlying, short the ETF" strategy. Our hedging hypothesis generates two 3 See Bloomburg Intelligence, September 8 th 2017. 4 Stock level short interest is reported in the online appendix (Table A.6). implications. First, the ability to hedge with the industry ETF incentivizes informed investors to trade more aggressively, as information rents become easier to capture. Consequently, the market becomes more informationally efficient. Second, short interest on the industry ETF generates a temporary price impact leading to a price reversal. The price reversal means short interest could positively predict the return of the industry ETF.
We test the first implication with earnings announcement events. We conjecture that earnings announcements are associated with lower market reactions if informed investors trade beforehand and prices incorporate more information before the announcement. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that industry ETF membership significantly reduces the market reaction to positive earnings surprises. We further demonstrate that industry ETF membership leads to ex-ante more aggressive buying by hedge funds when the future earnings surprise is positive. On the other hand, industry ETF membership does not generate any impact if the future earnings surprise is negative.
We test the second implication regarding the return predictability of short interest on the industry ETF by using a Fama-MacBeth approach. We find that the change in the short interest ratio ( ) positively predicts the future return for an industry ETF, whereas we find the opposite pattern for short interest on the firms in the industry ETF. That is, at the member-firm level, negatively predicts the future return. The firm-level result is consistent with past studies (see Rapach, Ringgenberg, and Zhou (2016) ), but as we demonstrate short interest on the industry ET itself behaves differently from short interest on member firms. Our result is consistent with the hedging hypothesis that extreme short interest reflects the long/short strategy from informed investors rather than bearish speculation on the industry.
Our paper contributes to the literature in a number of areas. The financial innovation literature shows that an important motive for creating a new financial security is to allow investors to hedge substantial risks, or more generally, to complete the financial market. Duffie and Rahi (1995) provide a comprehensive survey on this topic. Completing the financial market enables investors to better span their investment opportunities. Investors can isolate some risks with the new financial security which could lead to more beneficial portfolios (Chen (1995) ).
It could also lead to more informed trading. Dow (1998) shows that informed investors with better hedging trade more aggressively on information. Simsek (2013a Simsek ( , 2013b that difficulty hedging an option position affect prices in both the stock and option market. Battalio and Schultz (2011) and Grundy, Lim, and Verwijmeren (2012) study the 2008 shortsale ban and find that option bid-ask spreads increase for banned stocks. Their results imply option markets are disrupted when hedging the underlying stock with short-sales becomes difficult (or almost impossible). Our analysis of short interest on industry ETFs provides additional evidence on the impact of hedging-based short-sales. Our results also show an intriguing asymmetry as the hedging effect we identify only operates with respect to positive news, and not with negative news. We conjecture that this is due to the higher short-sale costs of individual stocks, making a "short the stock, long the ETF" strategy uneconomic.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the data and sample statistics.
Section 2 then investigates the role of short interest in industry ETFs, examines its relation to underlying firms' earning surprise, and estimates its impact on the market reaction to earning surprises. We also provide evidence on the channel through which these effects operate by
showing how industry ETFs change hedge funds trading behavior. In Section 3 we test the relation between the short interest ratio and returns in industry ETFs using a Fama-MacBeth approach. Section 4 provides some additional robustness and placebo tests. Section 5 is a conclusion.
Data description and sample statistics
Our sample consists of two sets of data. The first data set is the industry ETF sample. For each U.S. industry ETF, we track its short interest, holdings, price, and volume from its inception until December 2016. The second data set is the earnings announcement sample.
This data contains the earnings announcements of all publicly listed firms from January 1995 to December 2016. We also collect a variety of related data such as hedge fund holdings, mutual fund holdings, and firm characteristics. In this section, we discuss the construction of these two data sets in detail.
The ETF level data

A. The equity ETF
To construct the list of industry ETFs on US equity, we first need a list of US equity ETFs.
We start with the fund universe of the CRSP Survivor-biased-free Mutual Fund database ranging from July 2003 to December 2016. We identify a fund as an ETF if the "et_flag" of the fund is "F." Also, we require these funds to have the CRSP share-code of either "44" or "73." To obtain the non-synthetic US equity ETF, we drop funds whose name contains "bond," "bear," or "hedged." And to ensure our list consists of only equity ETFs, we apply a filter which requires our sample ETFs to have at least 80% investment in US common domestic stocks. After those steps, we merge our list with a snapshot of all US equity ETFs from ETFDB in July 2017. 5 Our final sample consists of 449 US equity ETFs, which is close to past studies.
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For each ETF, we track its holdings information since the inception date.
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B. The industry ETF
We extract industry ETFs from the abovementioned equity ETFs based on the holdings information. We match an ETF's holdings with the Fama-French 12 industry classification, and then identify the industry in which the ETF has the most investment. To qualify for an industry ETF, we require the dominating industry investment exceeds one-third of the ETF's portfolio size. This gives us 217 industry ETFs. We filter out ETFs whose name contains "value," "growth," "Russell," "dividend," or "momentum" to ensure the ETF targets for the industry coverage. After this step, we are left with 150 ETFs. We further require that the ETF consists of at least 30 stocks (in the on-line Appendix we remove this requirement and show that our results hold with this less restrictive industry ETF list). Finally, we obtain a list of 116 industry ETFs covering 11 out of 12 industries in the Fama-French classification. Figure 1 shows the time series growth of the total net asset value and industry coverage of our industry ETF sample.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
C. The price, volume, and short interest data for equity ETFs
We obtain the monthly price and volume for our ETF sample from CRSP. The monthly short interest for both equity ETFs and their underlying firms are from COMPUSTAT. Panel A and B in Table 1 report the summary statistics of price, volume, and short interest for our ETF sample. We report the industry and non-industry ETF, respectively.
[Insert 
The firm level data
A. Data on earnings announcements
We construct our data on earnings announcements based on analyst-target-price forecasts from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S), quarterly financial statements from COMPUSTAT, and financial market data from CRSP. We focus on quarterly earnings announcements that are available in both COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S. 8 Following Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) and other papers in this literature, we impose the following restrictions:
(1) Ordinary common shares listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.
(2) The earnings announcement date is reported in both COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S, and the earnings report dates in COMPUSTAT and in I/B/E/S differ by no more than one calendar day.
(3) The price-per-share at the end of the fiscal quarter is available from COMPUSTAT and is greater than $1.
(4) The market value of equity at the fiscal quarter-end is available and is larger than $5 million.
(5) Daily stock returns are available in CRSP for the dates around the earnings announcement. Moreover, we should be able to assign stock to one of the six FamaFrench benchmark portfolio based on size and book-to-market ratio.
In the analysis of the market reaction to the earnings announcement, we define an earnings surprise by the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). 
C. Data on institutional holdings
We follow Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2011) to construct institutional holdings for each firm at each quarter based on the Thompson Reuters 13F data. 10 Merging this with the above list on hedge funds, we obtain hedge fund holdings on our sample firms at each quarter.
To estimate abnormal holdings, we take the difference between the current quarter holdings and the moving average of the past four quarters holdings. Similarly, we obtain mutual fund abnormal holdings on our sample firms at each quarter. In Panel C Table 1 , we report summary 9 The detailed description can be referred to the online appendix of Jiang (2017) . 10 WRDS provides the detail code in constructing institutional holdings from the 13F data, see https://wrdsweb.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/research/applications/ownership/Institutional%20Trades/. statistics for our earnings announcements sample after winsorizing the bottom and top 1%. All our variables have a distribution similar to past studies.
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Industry ETFs, information, and hedging
Can industry ETFs facilitate informed trading and enhance the efficiency of the market?
In this section, we address this question by first examining the behavior of short interest on industry ETFs with a focus on whether it reflects speculation or hedging. We then look at how the level of short interest affects the market reaction to the earnings announcement. We further investigate the channels by which such effects arise by looking at the impact of industry ETFs on the portfolio holdings of hedge funds and mutual funds.
Why do investors short industry ETFs?
We begin our analysis by investigating the properties of short interest in ETFs. Panels A and B in Table 1 show that the short interest ratio of industry ETFs has a much longer right tail than that of non-industry ETFs. The industry ETF has a short interest ratio of 60% at the 95th percentile whereas the latter has less than 20% at the same percentile. Figure 2 shows the histogram of the short interest ratio. For industry ETFs, we observe a significant concentration of the short interest ratio at 100%. Such a pattern is not observed among non-industry ETFs.
The longer right tail of the short interest ratio indicates that industry ETFs experience more extreme short positions.
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[Insert Figure 2 here]
One natural explanation for the pattern in the industry ETF is that investors are betting against a specific industry, e.g., investors shorting the financial industry during the 2008 11 Our hedge fund abnormal holdings has similar magnitude on the mean and standard deviation as Chen, Da, and Huang (2016) . 12 In constructing the short interest ratio, we replace all ratios above 100% with 100%. In other words, the concentration of the short interest ratio at 100% represents a large cumulative mass of short interest exceeding 100%.
financial crisis. We call this the speculation hypothesis. An alternative hypothesis captures the hedging motive. 13 Informed investors short an industry ETF to hedge their long positions on particular underlying firms for which they have private information on firm-specific fundamentals. This "long-the-underlying" and "short-the-industry-ETF" strategy enables informed investors to hedge their industry risk exposure while obtaining rewards for certain individual stocks (in that industry).
These two hypotheses have distinct predictions regarding the future outlook of an industry ETF. The speculation hypothesis predicts a bearish outlook of the industry ETF, whereas the hedging hypothesis offers the opposite prediction: The large short position on an industry ETF reflects many informed investors with optimistic information about an underlying firm hedging heavily to isolate their positions from the industry risk.
To test these two hypotheses, we construct a quarterly measure that captures the earnings performance of each ETF's underlying. First, we compute the ratio of positive earnings among underlying firms in an ETF. We define a firm to have positive earnings if its SUE is in the top 25% of the entire sample. Second, at every quarter, we compute the positive earnings ratio as the ratio of underlying firms in an ETF that have positive earnings. This positive earnings ratio measures the economic outlook of an ETF's underlying. Panel D of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our positive earnings ratios for industry and non-industry ETFs.
After the above construction, we use the following regression to test predictions based on the speculation and hedging hypotheses:
where ),+ is the positive earnings ratio for ETF at quarter , and ),+2@ is the lagged short interest ratio for . We include the log total net asset value of in the contemporaneous quarter as a control variable. We also control for year, quarter, and ETF fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by ETFs and quarters. We estimate equation (1) on industry and nonindustry ETFs, respectively, and estimate equation (2) on all ETFs. In equation (2), the dummy variable interacting with the lagged short interest ratio captures the different predicting power of the short interest ratio between industry and non-industry ETFs. We show the regression result in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 here]
For an industry ETF, we find that a large short interest ratio predicts more positive earnings among its underlying firms. We find the opposite (or no predicting power) for a non-industry ETF. Our regression results from equation (2) More intriguing, we only observe this predictability among industry ETFs, and not among nonindustry ETFs.
We do not rule out the speculation hypothesis. In fact, we find that when including the financial crisis into our sample period, the predictability of past short interest is reduced by over 30% (from 0.0436 to 0.0324). The reduction is possibly due to high short interest and poor performance of the financial sector during the crisis. Hence, to focus on the hedging hypothesis and its economic implications, we exclude 2007 and 2008 in the remaining analysis. Results from the entire sample, showing that our results hold more generally over the whole sample period, are available in an online appendix.
The market reaction to the earnings surprise
In the previous sub-section, we find evidence consistent with informed investors using industry ETFs to hedge their long positions on the corresponding underlying. Such a strategy seems feasible as Li and Zhu (2017) show that ETFs are relatively easy to short, and the growing popularity of industry ETFs suggests it is becoming less expensive to do so. Reducing the costs of hedging facilitates informed investors trading which, in turn, should make the market more informative. Therefore, we hypothesize that the industry ETF has a positive impact on the informational efficiency of the market.
To test this hypothesis, we focus on earnings announcement events. We examine the market reaction to the earnings surprise, and study if industry ETF membership affects the reaction. More specifically, we run the regression:
),+ is the -1 to +1 cumulative abnormal daily return around the earnings announcement date based on the Fama-French three factor model.
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),+ is the standardized earnings surprise.
is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the firm is a constituent of an 15 Our result remains the same when we use the Fama-French four factor (including the momentum factor) model. industry ETF. The interaction term, × ),+ , captures how industry ETF membership affects the relationship between the market reaction ( ),+ ) to the earnings surprise ( ),+ ). In our controls, we include the market capitalization, the book-to-market ratio, the turnover, the momentum factor, the earnings persistence, and the number of analysts (see Panel C Table 1 for summary statistics on the variables used in Eq. (3)). In addition, we also control for industry, month, and year fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered by firms and announcement dates.
[Insert Table 3 here]
We estimate equation (3) on the full sample of our earnings announcements ranging from 1995 to 2016, excluding 2007 and 2008. 16 We also divide the earnings announcements sample into "Negative SUE" and "Positive SUE" groups. The "Negative SUE" group consists of the bottom 25% SUE of our sample, while the "Positive SUE" group consists of the top 25% SUE of our sample. We report the regression results in Table 3 .
Our regression results support the hypothesis that the industry ETF enhances pricing efficiency of its underlying. We find that the market reacts less to an earnings surprise when a firm is the constituent of an industry ETF. The coefficient on × ),+ is significantly negative, implying that more information is incorporated into the market before the earnings announcement. This could be due to more informed trading on firms in industry ETFs before earnings announcements. Additionally, the coefficient is only significantly negative when there is a positive earnings surprise. As the positive earnings surprise indicates the positive firm-specific information ex-ante, this finding further substantiates our hypothesis.
We hypothesize that the industry ETF encourages more informed trading through facilitating the "long-the-underlying" and "short-the-industry-ETF" strategy. As this strategy is applicable 16 All our results are similar when we include 2007 and 2008 . Please see the online appendix for more details.
when there is positive information on the underlying firm, the impact of the industry ETF emerges under positive information rather than negative information.
Hedge funds abnormal holdings and the earnings surprise
We showed that the market reacts less to an earnings surprise when the firm is a member of an industry ETF. With more informed investors trading in advance, this suggests that the market becomes more informationally efficient. There could be, however, other hypotheses explaining the decreasing reaction; for example, one could argue that it reflects the market's slow adjustment to the earnings news. To investigate more thoroughly if the industry ETF encourages more informed trading, and hence, improves efficiency, we consider the potential channels of our hedging argument. As noted earlier, hedge funds are active users of short interest ETF strategies and so seem likely candidates to implement this hedging strategy. To explore this possibility, we study hedge fund portfolio holdings.
Using data on aggregate hedge fund holdings, we run the regression model:
ℎ ),+ is the preceding abnormal holdings by hedge funds on firm at time . The abnormal holdings variable is estimated as the difference between the current quarter holdings and the moving average of holdings in past four quarters, standardized by the total shares outstanding. The summary statistics of ℎ ),+ are reported in Panel C Table 1 .
Other variables are the same as in equation (3).
In equation (4), we treat the current quarter earnings surprise, ),+ , as the realization of firm-specific information. If hedge funds' abnormal holdings (preceding the quarter) load significantly on ),+ , it implies hedge funds are aggressively changing their holdings based on the firm-specific information. Our main interest is on the coefficient of × ),+ . This coefficient captures the impact of the industry ETF membership on the relationship between hedge funds' abnormal holdings and the earnings surprise.
[Insert Table 4 here] Table 4 reports our regression result. In the full sample analysis, we do not find that industry ETF membership affects the relationship between ℎ ),+ and ),+ . But in the subsample analysis, when firms report positive earnings surprises, we find that hedge funds more aggressively increase holdings on firms with the industry ETF membership.
Conversely, we find that membership has no significant impact when firms report negative earnings surprises.
The one-sided impact shows that the industry ETF influences hedge funds only when there is positive information. This asymmetry could be due to the higher costs of shorting individual stocks, making a "long the ETF/short the stock" strategy infeasible when there is negative information. Our results here are consistent with our previous finding that the industry ETF improves informational efficiency when the earnings surprise is positive. Added to our results on hedge funds abnormal holdings, we can provide evidence on the channel of this improvement: specifically, industry ETFs encourage hedge fund trading on the firm-specific information. This leads to more information being impounded into the market.
Could this effect be better explained by the trading behavior of other institutional investors? A simple placebo test is to study abnormal holdings by mutual funds. Since mutual funds are not able to short, they are unlikely to apply the "long-the-underlying" and "short-theindustry-ETF" strategy. Thus, we hypothesis that the industry ETF shall not exert any impact on mutual funds abnormal holdings regarding the earnings surprise.
[Insert Table 5 here]
We ran the same regression as in equation (4) replacing ℎ ),+ with ℎ ),+ , the measure of mutual funds abnormal holdings. We construct this measure similar to the hedge funds measure, and report the summary statistics in Panel C Table 1 . In Table 5 , we see that industry ETF membership reduces the relationship between ℎ ),+ and ),+ in the full sample analysis. Most notably, it does not have any impact on the relationship when firms report positive earnings surprises. In contrast to the insignificant impact on mutual fund abnormal holdings, our previous result shows that the industry ETF increases the aggressiveness of hedge funds trading (Table 4 ). The sheer difference highlights the channel whereby the industry ETF improves pricing efficiency --it encourages informed trading through facilitating the long/short strategy for informed investors.
Predictable returns and short interest in industry ETFs
In Section 2, we showed that industry ETFs are more likely to experience extreme short interest than other ETFs, and we provide a hedging hypothesis ("long-the-underlying" and "short-the-industry-ETF") to explain this phenomenon. We show that one implication of this explanation is that industry ETFs enhance the informational efficiency of the market. That said, another implication of this hedging hypothesis is that extreme short interest should create a temporary price impact in industry ETFs. Extreme short interest creating selling pressure dampens the contemporaneous price. As the market gradually digests the shock, and realizes no industry-wide fundamental has changed, the price recovers. The price recovery implies the short interest ratio of an industry ETF, especially the change in that short interest ratio, should positively predict its future return. In contrast, the speculation hypothesis, which also explains extreme short interest, offers the different prediction. Based on the speculation hypothesis, extreme short interest reflecting the bearish speculation on industry should negatively predict the return of the corresponding industry ETF. Fama-MacBeth result is reported in Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 here]
We find that the change in the short interest ratio ( ) positively predicts the future return for an industry ETF. To the contrary, we find the opposite for the underlying firms in the industry ETF. That is, higher short interest in a constituent firm negatively predicts its future return. This latter member firm-level result is consistent with past studies (see Rapach, Ringgenberg, and Zhou (2016) ). Short interest on industry ETFs behaves differently from short interest on constituent firms. Our Fama-MacBeth regression result is consistent with the hedging hypothesis that extreme short interest reflects the long/short strategy from informed investors rather than the bearish speculation on the industry.
We also construct a long-short portfolio to further test the predictability of short interest on the industry ETF. We sort industry ETFs into deciles based on their every month.
After that, we long the ETF in the highest decile, and short the ETF in the lowest decile. We evaluate the return of this long-short portfolio based on the excess return, the CAPM alpha, the Fama-French alpha, and the Fama-French-Carhart alpha. Standard errors are Newy-West adjusted with one lag. We report our long-short portfolio results in Table 7 .
[Insert Table 7 here]
Our long-short portfolio generates a monthly alpha around 30 basis points, and it is significant at the 5% level. We apply the similar long-short portfolio on stocks, which are members of industry ETFs. In contrast to our findings on industry ETFs, we find the monthly alpha is around negative 30 to 40 basis points, and it is significant at the 1% level. Our longshort portfolio provides consistent evidence with the Fama-MacBeth result, i.e., the high short interest ratio on an industry ETF positively predicts the ETF's future return. This result is consistent with the implication of the hedging hypothesis. Extreme short interest reflects informed investors' hedging needs creating a temporary shock, which leads to the future price recovery.
Extensions and generalizations
Our analysis thus far shows strong support for the use of industry ETFs as hedging vehicles for informed traders. Our results also suggest an important role played by hedge funds in this process. What is always important to consider, however, is whether other evidence can be brought to bear to strengthen or refute our arguments. In this section, we consider two extensions to our analysis. First, we clarify the linkage of our results to informed trading by investigating how the correlation between the ETF and the underlying stock affects our "long the stock/short the ETF" strategy. Second, we examine more carefully whether hedge funds are acting as informed traders or whether their use of industry ETFs reflects other features particular to the unique structure of ETFs.
Correlations and industry ETF hedging
Our conjectured strategy of "long-the-underlying" and "short-the-industry-ETF" is intended to facilitate the trading of informed investors. Yet, this strategy should not work equally well across all stocks in an ETF. This is because trading on stocks with extremely high or low industry risk exposure will not benefit from establishing the hedge position. If a stock has high industry risk exposure, then it co-moves with the industry return. Consequently, the return to the stock and the ETF will be the same, and establishing a short position in the ETF is at cross purposes with the goal of profiting from information. On the other hand, if a stock has low industry risk exposure, then there is little reason to hedge with the industry ETF as the hedge will be ineffective. Hence, our strategy should not be working among these stocks either.
To test for these effects, we first compute the industry risk exposure for our sample stocks by regressing the stock-level daily return on the return of the stock-associated industry ETF.
We then average the adjusted F for each stock across all ETFs that include that stock. This allows us to sort the average adjusted F for our sample stocks and pick the top and bottom 15% based on their industry risk exposure. Using this sample of high and low exposure stocks,
we then redo our analysis on CAR and hedge funds abnormal holdings. 17 If our conjecture is correct that the ETF short position is used to hedge informed trading risk, then we should not find significant effects in this sub-sample.
[Insert Table 8 here] [Insert Table 9 here] Table 8 and 9 report the analysis results. Consistent with our conjecture, we do not find industry ETF membership significantly reduces the return response to the earnings surprise for stocks with extremely high or low industry risk exposures. In Table 9 , we also fail to find for those stocks that the industry ETF membership leads to more aggressive hedge funds trading before the positive earnings surprise.
[Insert Table 10 here]
[Insert Table 11 here] 17 We repeated the analysis with different cut-offs such as the top and bottom 10%, 20%, or 25%. Our results are largely consistent.
To complete the test for our conjecture, we also report the results for our sample stocks with the medium industry risk exposure, i.e., stocks with adjusted F between the top and bottom 15% of our sample. Table 10 and 11 report these results. Here, we find the industry ETF membership significantly reduces the return response to the earnings surprise, especially with the positive earnings surprise. In Table 11 , we find that hedge funds trade more aggressively for stocks with the industry ETF membership before positive earnings surprises.
Both results are consistent with our earlier findings and underscore the important hedging role played by the ETF in facilitating informed trading.
Hedging risk or arbitrage of industry ETFs
One of the important innovations underlying the ETF structure is the creation and redemption process. This daily settling-up ensures that the price of the ETF and the value of the underlying constituent stocks stays within tight bounds. If the ETF becomes overpriced, market arbitrageurs (known as Authorized Participants) will sell the ETF, buy the underlying stocks, and at the end of the day present the bundle of stocks to the ETF provider for a new ETF, thereby settling their short position. If the stocks are overpriced, the process works in reverse. 18 Hedge funds can be participants in this process, and in the case of industry ETFs this strategy implies arbitraging through loading on industry risks. This behavior raises the concern that the positive correlation between the ratio of hedge funds positive abnormal holdings and short interest in ETF is due solely to arbitrage activity and not to information-based trading. If this were the case, then we would expect to find that short interest which also relates to industry risks should be positively associated with the aggregate hedge funds' trading.
To address this concern, we compute for each industry ETF the ratio of its constituent stocks that have positive abnormal hedge fund holdings (%HfPosAH) in the past quarter. [Insert Table 12 here]
To explore the relationship between this ratio of hedge funds positive abnormal holdings and the ETF's lagged short interest ( +2@ ), we run the following regression:
Panel B of Table 12 reports the regression result. We find that the relation between %HfPosAH and +2@ is insignificant. This suggests that the lagged short interest does not predict the industry-wide hedge funds positions. This is consistent with our hypothesis of a "long-theunderlying" and "short-the-industry-ETF" strategy being used to isolate the position on the firm-specific risk. 19 Because hedge funds bet on firm-specific risks of the ETF members, the aggregate hedge funds' trading (betting on firm-specific risks) in underlying stocks is not related to industry risks, and thus is not related to ETF short interest.
19 The stock return consists of three components, market risks, industry-level risks, and idiosyncratic firm-specific risks (see Campbell et al. (2001) ). While market risks can be hedged with index futures, disaggregating the latter two is more difficult (due to the lack of instruments or costly to implement). The "long-the-underlying" and "short-the-industry-ETF" enables investors to deal with this difficulty. That is, when hedge funds have information about firm-specific components, the aforementioned long/short strategy facilitates investors to isolate their positions on firm-specific risks. Here, the short position on the industry ETF serves as the hedge of industry risks.
Conclusions
Our results show that they can by facilitating the hedging of industry risk for informed investors. We demonstrate that because of this hedging role increased short interest in industry
ETFs is a bullish, not bearish, signal of future performance. Using earnings announcement events, we show that industry ETF short interest predicts more positive earnings surprises among its underlying stocks. We also find that it reduces the market reaction to positive earnings surprises and leads to ex-ante more trading by hedge funds. These effects are consistent with industry ETFs increasing informed trading in individual stocks, thereby making the market more informationally efficient. We also showed that the change in industry short interest predicts the future return for the industry ETF, a result we ascribe to the hedging-based use of the ETF inducing a temporary price impact that reverses when new industry information does not materialize. Overall, industry ETFs appear to be a valuable innovation in the market.
One aspect of our results that we find particularly intriguing is the asymmetry of the effects: these positive effects on the market arise only with positive news about firms and not negative news. We believe this reflects another aspect of this financial innovation as industry Panel A and B report the summary statistics on quarter short interest ratio (SIR), price, volume, and total net asset value (TNA) for industry and non-industry ETFs, respectively. The quarter measure is constructed by taking the average of monthly observations. Panel C reports the summary statistics for firms in our earnings announcement sample. DummyIndetfown is the dummy variable which equals to 1 if the firm is a member of an industry ETF. CAR is the -1 to +1 cumulative abnormal daily return around the earnings announcement date based on the Fama-French three factor model. SUE is the standardized earnings surprise computed from a rolling seasonal random walk model. HfAhdngRatio and MfAhdngRatio are the abnormal holdings from hedge funds and mutual funds, respectively. Both holdings are standardized by shares outstanding. log(MktCap) is the log transformed market capitalization. BM is the book-to-market ratio where the book value is measured as the preceding fiscal year, and market value is measured as of the end of that calendar year. TR is the turnover measured as the average of the daily ratios of volume over shares outstanding from -40 to -11 of each announcement. MOM is the cumulative raw return over the six-month period ending one month prior to the announcement month. EarnPerst is the earnings persistence as of the first-order auto-regressive coefficient of quarterly earnings over the past four years. NumEst is the number of analysts. Panel D reports the summary statistics on the ratio of positive SUE in an ETF over our sample period. The positive SUE is defined as the SUE exceeding the 75 percentile of all SUEs in the sample. Table 2 : Regress the positive earnings ratio on the lagged short interest at the ETF level Table 2 reports the result of regressing the positive earnings ratio ( ),+ ) on the lagged short interest ratio ( ),+2@ ), i.e., ),+ = ) + + + @ ),+2@ + + ),+ ,
),+ = ) + + + @ ),+2@ + F × ),+2@ + + ),+ .
We run the first regression model on industry and non-industry ETFs, respectively. And we use the second regression model to estimate the difference in the predicting power of the short interest ratio to the positive earnings ratio between industry and non-industry ETFs. The difference is captured by F (the coefficient on × ),+2@ ). In our controls, we include log total net asset value, and year, quarter, and ETF fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered by ETFs and quarters. Panel A reports the result on full sample, and Panel B reports the result on full sample excluding year 2007 and 2008. *** is significant at 1%, ** is significant at 5%, and * is significant at 10%. t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. Table 3 : The regression result on the market reaction to the earnings surprise Table 3 reports the regression result on the following model,
),+ is the standardized earnings surprise computed from a rolling seasonal random walk model. is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the firm is a constituent of an industry ETF. × ),+ is the interaction term. In our control variables, we include the market capitalization, the book-to-market ratio, the turnover, the momentum factor, the earnings persistence, and the number of analysts. In addition, we also control for industry, month, and year fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered by firms and announcement dates. We run the above regression model on the full sample of our earnings announcements ranging from 1995 to 2016, with the exception of 2007 and 2008. Furthermore, we split our earnings announcements sample into the "Negative SUE" and "Positive SUE" group based on the earnings surprise, ),+ . The "Negative SUE" group consists of the bottom 25% ),+ in our sample, while the "Positive SUE" group consists of the top 25%
),+ in our sample. *** is significant at 1%, ** is significant at 5%, and * is significant at 10%. t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. (A4) ℎ ),+ is the abnormal holdings by hedge funds standardized by total shares outstanding. The abnormal holdings is estimated as the difference between the current quarter holdings and the moving average of holdings in past four quarters.
),+ in our sample. *** is significant at 1%, ** is significant at 5%, and * is significant at 10%. t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. (A5) ℎ ),+ is the abnormal holdings by mutual funds standardized by total shares outstanding. The abnormal holdings is estimated as the difference between the current quarter holdings and the moving average of holdings in past four quarters.
),+ in our sample. *** is significant at 1%, ** is significant at 5%, and * is significant at 10%. t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. Table 6 : Fama-MacBeth regression of returns on short interest ratios Table 6 reports the time-series averages of slope coefficients from Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions on returns, +c@ , and changes in the short interest ratio, + , for industry ETFs and their member firms, respectively. t-statistic reported in the parenthesis is calculated using the average slope coefficient divided by its time-series standard error adjusted by Newey-West with one lag. For each industry ETF, we average the member firms' characteristics, and use the average as a control in our regression. We also repeat the FamaMacBeth regression on industry ETFs' member firms, and report in the last two columns. For the firm level regression, the control variable corresponds to each firm's own characteristics. The sample period of our analysis is reported in the last row of the table. *** is significant at 1%, ** is significant at 5%, and * is significant at 10%. Table 7 : Long-short portfolio sorts on ΔSIR 
),+ in our sample. *** is significant at 1%, ** is significant at 5%, and * is significant at 10%. t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. (A7) ℎ ),+ is the abnormal holdings by hedge funds standardized by total shares outstanding. The abnormal holdings is estimated as the difference between the current quarter holdings and the moving average of holdings in past four quarters.
),+ in our sample. *** is significant at 1%, ** is significant at 5%, and * is significant at 10%. t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. 
),+ in our sample. *** is significant at 1%, ** is significant at 5%, and * is significant at 10%. t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. (A9) ℎ ),+ is the abnormal holdings by hedge funds standardized by total shares outstanding. The abnormal holdings is estimated as the difference between the current quarter holdings and the moving average of holdings in past four quarters.
In our controls, we include log transformed total net asset value, and year, quarter, and ETF fixed effects. Figure 2 shows the histogram of the short interest ratio of industry (top panel) and non-industry ETFs (bottom panel), respectively. The short interest ratio is sampled quarterly using the average monthly ration in a quarter.
